Denver Law Review
Volume 20

Issue 5

Article 10

1943

Vol. 20, no. 5: Full Issue
Dicta Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
20 Dicta (1943).

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

VOLUME 20

1943

The Denver Bar Association
The Colorado Bar Association
1943

PRINTED IN U. S. A.

THE BRADFORD-ROBINSON PRINTING CO.
DENVER, COLORADO

Vol. XX

MAY, 1943

No. 5

Judicial Protection of Minority Groups
Under the Weimar Republic
By

EDWIN M. SIERADZ*

The story of the German Weimar Republic is of more than academic interest to Americans. Wilson's fourteen points rang in the momentous event of its birth, and with its open or veiled overthrow, that
chain of hectic events began which finally saw America's entry in World
War II.
For the American lawyer especially, Germany under the Weirmar
Constitution offers a great deal of interest. Some of its achievements,
for example, its system of sbcial security and its compulsory arbitration
of labor disputes, might justify closer study with an eye to'"getting a
few points." In other respects the history of the Weimar Republic is
an account of total failure; but even then worthwhile knowing, if only
to make us see its shortcomings so that we may avoid similar blunders.
It is the purpose of this paper to record the history of one such
failure, the inability of judicial machinery to protect loyal democratic
groups within Germany against aggression by ribald and pugnacious
law violators. Some conclusions to be drawn from this tragic failure
are of immediate interest to us. A few examples will illustrate the type
of controversy involved.
In the book of a professed "military expert" it was charged that
the Freemasons were guilty of the German defeat in 1918. In great
detail and with much "documentary evidence," the author asserted that
*Mr. Sieradz was born in Germany in 1903. He received from the University of
Berlin the LL.B. degree in 1930 and the J.D. degree in 1933. He acted as private
secretary to Dr. Albert Einstein while studying law and became an assistant instructor
in law in the University of Berlin in 1931. continuing as such until 1933. when be
was ousted by Hitler. In 1939 he came to the United States and was granted a fellowship at the University of Denver. where he received the .I..B. degree in 1942.
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one Lieutenant Henschke, under orders of the Freemasons, suppressed an
order given to him by his commander for delivery to another army unit,
and that this breach of duty caused that fateful gap in the Marne front
which finally enabled the Allies to break through in 19 18.
Or the Stuermer (Stormer), that disgrace to all newspapers, might
falsely disclose to the world that a certain Catholic statesman, just back
from Rome, went there to get the Pope's orders on how to run Germany.
and that he had vowed to act in maiorem papae qloriam only, with utter
disregard of German interests.
Or the Schwarze Korps, the paper of Hitler's Elite Guard, would
hire an unscrupulous physicist to "prove" that Einstein's theory of relativity was nothing but a particularly vicious Jewish attempt to confuse
German minds, and then to utilize the general disorder to gain domination of Germany.
What were the possibilities given by the law to deal with such
odious vilifications?
Generally speaking, there were three ways: police action (which.
however, was limited by the "act protecting the freedom of the press"),
a civil action by the aggrieved party, or criminal prosecution.
Under the famous Section 10, Part 2, Title 17, of the Preussisches
Allgemeines Landrecht (General Statutes for the Prussian States),
which dates back to Frederick the Great, and under other provisions
similar in scope, the police had the right to act whenever and however
necessary to preserve public safety and good order. Ordinarily it could
address itself only to the one responsible (der stoerer) for a disturbance.
This provision, it would seem, was broad enough to give the police appropriate authority to intercede in almost any case of public disturbances, and in many respects it was liberally construed. But the Borkurnlied (Borkum song) case is a good example of what the highest Prussian
court in the field of administrative law did to that good old statute when
it came to the protection of a group.
The inhabitants and guests in the summer resort Borkum had somehow contracted the habit of singing a vile text to the tune of a German
folksong, harmless in itself. The substituted words openly advocated
violence against certain groups within the German population. The
song came to be known all over Germany in this deteriorated form as the
Borhumlied. In fact, practically no one, including this writer, could
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remember the original words. The local band, to please its rowdy listeners, closed every concert by playing this infamous song, knowing, of
course, full well that the audience would lugtily blare the obnoxious
text. The court raversed an order of the local police prohibiting the
band from playing the tune because, it said, not the band, but the crowd
were the ones who caused the disturbance. The tune, it opined, was all
right. Was it the band's fault that the audience used it as a basis for
unlawful utterances?
Well, I think it was, and many outstanding German jurists thought
so, too.
It was in the field of criminal prosecution where the shortcomings
of court action as a means in the fight against group discrimination were
most pronounced. This was not the fault of the law itself, which was,
before court interpretation narrowed its scope, inclusive enough to give
adequate protection, as the following survey will show.
Where a person made derogatory statements of fact or of opinion
to the aggrieved party himself or to third persons, he was criminally
liable for a Beleidigung, which crime is broader than the common law
"criminal libel," inasmuch as it includes opinions and unpublished
statements regardless of whether oral or written., The weakness of these
broad prohibitions, as far as group protection was concerned, was that,
according to the German Supreme Court, they did not apply to the libeling of a group as such. A man could therefore insult "the Jews," "the
Catholics" or, as was done frequently, "the German judges" without
fear of criminal responsibility. It was only where the defamatory remark
imputed a derogation of individuals that the sanction of the law could
be invoked. The decisions holding one way or the other can hardly be
reconciled. It has, for example, been consistently held that derogation of
"the German judges" or "the Jews" was group defamation and, therefore, not within the protection of the defamation laws. On the other
hand, a man has been penalized for saying that "all German World War.
Corporals were Himmelstosse," referring to the repulsive character of
Corporal Himmelstoss in Remarque's well known novel, All Quiet on
the Western Front.
I do not see on what sound distinction this difference in the results
can be based.
'PENAL CODE, Sec. 185. et seq.
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The preaching of group hatred would often violate Section 130 of
the German Criminal Code, which made it a criminal offense to "incite
violence in a manner dangerous to the public peace." This section was
being vigorously applied under the Kaiser, against any reformer or
social-democrat who made statements even faintly approaching a suggestion of violence. But the courts were strangely reluctant to apply it
in any effective way when reactionaries urged to "kill the November
criminals" (i. e., the leaders of the German revolution in 1918), or to
'kill the Jews."
This writer was present, working as an "intern" in the District
Attorney's office, at a trial against certain adolescents who had been
indicted for shouting "kill the black pigs," meaning the Catholic Zentrum Party, and "kill the Jews." The case against those accused seemed
as clear as possible. But the court acquitted the defendants for "lack of
evidence" that the individuals before the court had participated in the
shouting. Now the defendants had admitted that they were members
of the group which had united for just the purpose of such unlawful
demonstration, and to anyone familiar with conditions then prevailing
in Germany, including the judge, it was a perfectly absurd idea that just
these boys should have kept their mouths shut while everyone else
around them was roaring.
When "God" or any essential' institution of an incorporated religious community were attacked, the offender might have been criminally
liable for "publicly blaspheming God with offensive expressions."-2 But
this statutory provision was no more effective than were the ones to
which we have previously referred.
It is almost impossible to give even a vague idea of the vile denunciations of especially the Jewish and Catholic faiths which were commonplace in such books as those of the Nazi "philosopher" Rosenberg,
The Myth of the 20th Century, or in the outright pornographic
Pfaffenspiegel (Parsons' mirror). No sound imagination would be fertile enough to invent such stories as there "reported," ranging all the
way from Catholic conspiracies to rape any and all female confessors, to
Jewish ritual murders.
But convictions for such flagrant law violations were not frequent,
and the penalties exacted were too light to serve as a deterrent.
"PENAL. CODE, Sec. 166.
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Since many of the active foes of the Weimar Republic also were
apostles of group hatred, the "Act for the Protection of the Republic,"
enacted in 1922 after Rathenau's assassination, could and did for a while
effectively, though indirectly, serve as a basis to protect group rights.
Among its provisions was one making the slandering of deceased German
statesmen a criminal offense. 3 This innovation had become necessary
because those violent rabble rousers used to smear in a perfectly incommunicable manner the memory of certain republican statesmen. One of
their pet hates was Erzberger, Catholic secretary of the treasury, assassinated in 1921. Their technique was to use the fabricated misdeeds of
those defenseless men as a means of inciting hatred against the groups
of which they were members, and thereby undermine the republic which
those groups supported.
For a while this act served adequately to protect the republic, and
the groups supporting it, against the specific type of slander or violence
banned by the act. But here again an interesting case of "wearing off"
is to be noted. The courts again began their corrosive work, and after
a while it was possible to call the Weimar Republic the "Jewish Republic" without running counter to the law. Such designation, clearly intended to discredit the Weimar Republic in the eyes of the reactionaries,
was held ordinarily not to constitute a defamation of the republic within
the meaning the statute.
It is only fair to note that the fiasco of group protection by criminal
or police action was not experienced when group protection by a civil
action for injunctional relief was sought. When a businessman tried to
improve his fortune by advertising that fie owned the "only German
store in town," or when he urged not to buy from a competitor because
of the latter's group affiliation, the courts would enjoin such action on
the authority of Section 826 of the Civil Code (the German version of
the Roman Actio doli), or under the "act prohibiting unfair competition." It is, indeed, a claim to glory of the German Supreme Court that
as late as 1938, five years after Hitler's accession to power, it dared declare
such a business practice unlawful. And it does not detract from this
exhibition of courage that the party prevailing in that suit could hardly
make use of its judgment, for the simple reason that the sovereign Ges'Sec. 5. No. 3.
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tapo, unperturbed by such legalistic whimsicalities, could and would not
allow the victor to stand on his documented right.
These examples naturally raise the question of how this over-all
fiasco of group protection by court procedure can be explained in a nation
which produced jurists of such international renown as Savigny, Ihering,
Gierke, Liszt, to name only a few? And also, can a lesson be learned
from this failure for the United States citizens in their fight for civil
liberties and human decency?
The answer is not a simple yes or no; it is complex, as is the problem involved. But a few conclusions may be securely drawn.
The failure of group protection under the Weimar Constitution
was partly due to conditions peculiarly German, which would not bc
encountered in this country if we were to try to fight group discrimination by concerted court action. Here are some of them:
The Weimar Republic inherited almost in toto the reactionary
judiciary and executive officers of the monarchy. Those men, in their
outspoken or unconscious antagonism to the republic, were naturally
disinclined to give force to the laws directed at the protection of the
republic or of the groups supporting it. As many of these groups seeking
court action had been denied their full measure of civil rights under the
monarchy (e. g., the "Order of the Jesuits," the "Social-democrats," and
factually, though not in law, the Jews), and were given full equality
under the republic, the judges considered questions of group rights a
political rather than a legal controversy. They, therefore, were reluctant
to brand a man a criminal and throw him into jail for what appeared
to them a disputable political credo rather than a criminal act.
Another peculiarly German feature telling against judicial effectiveness in the fight against group discrimination were the frequent general
pardons granted under the Weimar Republic. A convicted law breaker
had an excellent chance never to serve his term nor to pay his fine. These
amnesties naturally deprived a conviction of whatever deterrent effect it
might have otherwise had.
Another frequently employed means to beat the law was to make a
member of parliament the so-called "responsible editor" of a newspaper
bent on Jew-baiting or dissemination of other group hatred. Under the
screen of the editor's parliamentary immunity, the paper could lustily
violate every law on the books without having to worry about criminal
liability.
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The number of lawbreakers who in one way or another managed
to keep out of prison is legion. Among them are Joseph Goebbels, then
editor of the Angriff (Attack) , and Streicher, editor of the wildest
Notwithstanding numerous flagrant
pornographic sheet imaginable.
breaches of the law and even occasional convictions, they never had to
serve a term.
While the circumstances just stated, telling against effective court
action, were peculiarly German and would not necessarily be encountered if in this country concerted court proceedings were tried as a means
to fight group discrimination, there is at least one additional weakness
in such a course which is inherent to it and can hardly be eliminated
anywhere.
The conviction of the rabble rouser, far from discrediting him in
the eyes of his followers or in those of most of the indifferent, gives him
the halo of martyrdom and thereby aids rather than harms his cause.
The publicity given him by the court trial, frequently swelled by newspaper reports, works in the same undesirable direction. Further, American courts might'be as reluctant as the German to convict a man as a
criminal for acts which, abhorred by the courts though they might be,
in most cases touched a sensitive area of political controversialness.
The conclusion then, to be arrived at on the basis of the foregoing,
is that court action must remain an exceptional means in the fight against
group incrimination and discrimination, because the problems involved
are political and educational in nature rather than justiciable.
I cannot close without citing the most glowing example of such
constructive group defense known to this writer.
In or about 1935, the Catholic bishops of Germany set out to
answer some of the assaults made on the church, especially those contained in the Nazi High Priest Rosenberg's book, The Myth of the 20th
Century. At a time when such an act might have meant death, this
body published a remarkable booklet, tearing apart those inane accusations with truly masterly scholarliness, with admirable clarity, in a
style which only the self-assuredness gained from centuries of victorious
survival can give. I do not believe that anyone who reads this pamphlet
could ever again fall for the cheap trash of the Streicher. Rosenberg and
other Nazi apostles.
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Private Industry Must Plan
for Post-War Era
American private industry must make plans for its operations in
the approaching post-war world. Lawyers can perform a valuable service in this planning "by reanalyzing both the laws which governed private business in pre-war days and the new governmental economic
controls put in force since Pearl Harbor." Donald S. Frey, New York
attorney, expresses this opinion in the current issue of the American
Bar Association Journal.
"The legal profession as a whole, by studying each client's specific
operations in the light of national experience with peace and wartime
trade regulations, and also in the light of expressed post-war aims of our
political leaders, can make its greatest contribution toward a just and
durable peace," Mr. Frey continued.
In addition to the prospect of profit, the basic aim of private industry is to create better living standards, he adds. The basic aim of government is to maintain the present system of free competition as a means for
improving living standards.
"Some of the wartime governmental restrictions may be continued
after the war as a necessary part of free competition," Mr. Frey points
out. "If the United Nations are victorious, similar controls in foreign
commerce may be established. Price ceilings will remain on scarce commodities until competition is again in a position to control prices."
This New York attorney further states that as a peacetime control
a policy of full employment of the people at all times may be adopted.
The problem, he says, will then be to produce enough goods and services
to absorb the income earned as a result of full employment.
"In foreign commerce, free competition will provide a satisfactory
beginning for an economic internationalism, which is just as essential for
an enduring peace as a political internationalism," Mr. Frey believes.
"Lawyers must clarify the rights and duties of all individuals, special
groups and nations which will result from the establishment of the free
competitive system throughout the whole world. By so doing, they
will further a system of government not by men, but a government by
laws enacted for the majority, but with safeguards for all minorities."

"Ethics" Forbid Disclosures of
Judicial Malfeasance
By FRANK SWANCARA*
Since 1924 the Supreme Court of Colorado has recommended the
Code of Ethics as adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908.
The first canon concludes with these two sentences:
"Whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint of a
judicial officer, it is the right and duty of the lawyer to submit his
grievances to the proper authorities. In such cases, but not otherwise, such charges should be encouraged and the person making
them should be protected."
This means that a lawyer will not be "protected" but may be disbarred for criticism if the "serious complaint" is made known to the
people, they not being the "proper authorities," and the disclosure will
be deemed, according to the authorities, not a lesser but an aggravated
misconduct if the facts are truthfully alleged in the grievances or comment. So construed, the code is consistent with what the courts themselves have said and done. At the beginning they were influenced by,
and conformed to, the old law of libel, under which truth was not a
justification for language imputing malfeasance to public officials. "The
doctrine * * * came from the court of Star Chamber.", When it became
recognized as part of the common law, it was defended on the theory
"that truth may be as dangerous to society as falsehood, when exhibited
in a way calculated to disturb the public tranquility, or to excite to a
breach of the peace."' Consequently most of our "colonial courts, like
the courts of England, were willing tools2 in the hands of the executive
to crush all criticism of the government."When courts usurped the power to punish as for contempt an;
adverse comment on their conduct tending to create popular disapproval
of what had been officially done, they appropriated and applied the same
doctrine, and so in contempt cases the rule was, and still is, that "it is
entirely immaterial whether the matter published is true or false. ' '3 That
was logical, for if courts needed protection against charges of malfeasance,
true ones would be more harmful than the false. The next step was to
apply the same rule in disbarment proceedings, so that there, too, evi*Of the Denver bar.
'People v. Croswell, 3 Johnson's Cases (N. Y.) 326, 3 Wheeler's Crim. R. 330
(1804).
2
Mr. Justice H. P. Burke, Uncle Sam's Business, 30 Colo. Bar Assn. Rep. 120.
126 (1927).
3
People v. News-Times Pub. Co., 35 Colo. 253, 84 Pac. 912 (1905).
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dence of the truth would be excluded, where the proceedings were based
on a lawyer's criticism of a judge. Publications which would be constructive contempt if made by a layman, were proof of "misconduct" if
made by a lawyer,' and it was enough to constitute "misconduct" if the
irritated judge saw fit to brand the comment as such.5
Courts did not, and could not, publicly admit that truth is no
defense in disbarments for comment, for to do so would also admit that
it is possible for judges to be as bad as charged by the respondent. Accordingly it became convenient to "find" that the critic's charges were
'false."
But in at least one case6 it was frankly declared that if serious
charges were "established" they would be attended with "the gravest
results," meaning that to expose one arbitrary judge would create public
distrust of all others. The opinion would permit, but did not encourage,
the making of complaints "in the manner provided by law," that is,
an appeal to the legislature to exercise its power of impeachment.
An opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio makes it clear that what
is meant by ''the proper authorities," as used i.n our code of ethics, to
whom alone may the lawyer disclose his "complaint," especially of an
appellate judge, are the legislators who have the power to remove judges
by impeachment. After quoting the first canon of our ethics, the court
said:7
"If the judges who were attacked in these circulars were believed by the respondent to be guilty as he charges and insinuates,
it was his privilege and duty to do what he could 'to have them
impeached, so that they might be deposed from office, when found
guilty."
In defending that theory of duty, the Supreme Court of Arkansas
said that in an impeachment trial the conduct of the judge "may undergo
a full investigation.'' but gave no assurance that a trial could be obtained. In the Ohio case the lawyer's criticisms related to conduct during terms that were then about to expire, and if he had gone to the next
legislature he would have been confronted with the authorities holding
"that an officer cannot be removed from office for an act committed during a prior term.
Rarely, if ever, is there a judicial offense bad enough to justify
impeachment, but frequently it deserves such criticism as could be, arbi'State v. McClaugherty, 33 W. Va. 250. 10 S. E. 407 (1889).

'See opinion of trial court in Austin's Case, 5 Rawle (Pa.) 191, 200 (1835).
'In re Murray, 58 Hun 604, 11 N. Y. S. 336 (1890) quoted, In re Knight, 34
N. Y. S. (2d) 810, 814 (1942).
7
1n re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. 492. 89 N. E. 39 (1909).
'State v- Morrill. 16 Ark. 384. 403 (1855).
"Note. Ann. Cas. 1916B 708.
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trarily, held "contemptuous" and a cause for disbarment. If in any
case "grievances" were submitted to a legislature, the charges would likely
be ignored or ridiculed, and if considered at all, dismissed in pretended
conformity to the judge-made law that even before an impeaching body
" serious" charges should not be "entertained for a moment, except upon
the most impressive evidence at least."" Evidence would not likely be
"impressive" to legislators politically affiliated with the judge.
While a clergyman, 11 an editor,t1 a labor leader,-: or any other citizen who is not a member of the bar can freely give information and
opinion on the demerits of a judge, and defend himself against a "scandalous, scurrilous, and defamatory" court opinion," 4 the professional
code of ethics denies the same right to the attorney, a citizen better
informed. To enforce that code, courts have disbarred lawyers for
arguments used in opposing judicial candidates for re-election. The
judges professed that they "thoroughly considered the authorities,","
and followed them, but the "authorities" were no more imperative there
than in the recent contempt cases which reject them.
The Code of Ethics formulated and adopted by the American Bar
Association was based on the 1887 code of the Alabama Bar Association,", but the latter code did not contain the last two sentences of what
is now our first canon. Instead it provided, in substance, that "attorneys
should, as a rule, refrain from published criticism of judicial conduct."
That was also the provision of the code published by the Colorado Bar
Association in 1899.
The American Bar Association's committee on ethics in 1907 recommended that Chief Justice Sharswood's Professional Ethics be reprinted, as it later was, as a volume of the American Bar Association
Reports, but the association and its committee thereafter went contrary
to Sharswood's doctrine on the right to criticize the conduct of elective
judges. When that great Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had occasion to speak officially on that subject, he did not attempt
to muzzle the bar by any language resembling our first canon of ethics,
but after referring to the fact that at the time of some earlier decisions on
misconduct the judges were appointed for life, declared that since "the
"'In re Murray, supra note 6.

"Lauder v. Jones, 13 N. D. 535, 101 N. W. 907 (suggesting absence of any
proceeding against the clergyman who wrote the affidavit involved).
Nixon v. State, 207 Ind. 426, 193 N. E. 591, 97 A. L. R. 894 (1935).
"Bridges v. California. 314 U. S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. ed. 192 (1941).
"Nadeau v. Texas Co., 104 Mont. 558, 69 P. (2d) 593 (1937), showing the
possibility of such opinions.
"In re Humphrey, 174 Cal. 290, 163 Pac. 60 (1917), following In re Thatcher,
supra note 7.
"n31 A. B. A. Rep. (1907).
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case is altered * * * it is now the right and the duty of a lawyer to bring
to the notice of the people who elect the judges every instance of what he
believes to be corruption or partisanship. ' ' 1 7 Now that laymen may
freely speak, it is timely to note that the Chief Justice also said:
"No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope
in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar."
One disbarring court' s in refusing to follow Chief Justice Sharswood's opinion declared that his holding was compelled by a clause in
the Pennsylvania bill of rights relating to prosecutions for libel, but that
cannot be true because the reasoning and the result was obviously based
on the fact that the people elect the judges. Mr. Justice Steele of the
Supreme Court of Colorado, and Mr. Justice Field of the United States
Supreme Court, saw and quoted with approval' what had been said by
Chief Justice Sharswood on the right and duty of a lawyer to give information and opinion to people who would hear, instead of appealing
solely to a deaf and indifferent legislature. In a recent Tennessee case, 2'
the Sharswood opinion was again approved, and as if repudiating the
two muzzling sentences in the first canon of our ethics, the court quoted
all of that canon except such sentences.
The Colorado Bar Association's canon No. 2 discouraged "published criticism" by those "who have been of counsel" in the cases involved, but only such counsel know the facts, and if silenced, others lack
the information upon which to speak. Yet, then as now, if informed
counsel assail improper judicial acts, they are in danger of being, in
published disbarring opinions, perpetually libeled as libelers peeved by
losng in a litigious gamble.
The first canon of our ethics, requiring that complaints be made,
if at all, only to impeaching "authorities," silences not only the attorney
knowing the grievances of a litigant but also the man who in self-defense
intends to write a candid autobiography, "confident in his own soul
that he had done no wrong.""
If continued disbarment for conviction of a statutory offense would
cause "a lesser Burns * * * to conceive a greater line. than 'Man's inhumanity to man', -2 a suspension for justifiable comment would prove
'"Ex parte Steinman, 95 Pa. St. 220 (1880).

"SState v. McClaugherty, supra note 4.
'"People v. News-Times Pub. Co., supra note 3; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265,

309, 2 S. Ct. 569, 27 L. ed. 552 (1882).

'Inre Hickey, 149 Tenn. 344, 258 S.W. 417 (1924.).
"See Hilliard, J., in People v. Lindsey, 93 Colo. 41, 23 P. (2d) 118 (1933).
-Hilliard, J., in People v. ILaska. 109 Colo. 389, 126 P. (2d) 500 (1942).
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its verity. Only Shelley, another poet, dared to denounce Lord Ellenborough for his oppression of Daniel Isaac Eaton, The ethical bar was
silent, as it was when Lord Hale condemned "witches" to death.
For a long time it was criminal libel to tell the truth about a tyrannical executive, but constitutions came to make the truth a defense in
prosecutions for libel. 2 3 If truth about a corrupt judge was told by a
layman, it was contempt; if told by a lawyer it was not only contempt
In 1882
but also "misconduct" which was punished by disbarment.
Mr. Justice Field wrote :24
"The power to punish for contempt * * * was formerly so
often abused for the purpose of gratifying personal dislikes, as to
cause general complaint, and lead to legislation defining the power
and designating the cases in which it might be exercised."
But the power to punish comment2 4 as "misconduct"
reminding that Mr. Justice Field also said:

remains,25

"Doctrines are sometimes advanced upholding the most arbitrary power in the courts, utterly inconsistent with any manly
independence of the bar."
Free speech for the citizen outside the bar, with respect to judicial
conduct, is upheld by the highest court of the land, 26 and by many state
courts. 2 7 But "ethics" still withhold that liberty from the lawyer, and
to conform, he must remain the same silenced serf as his precursor was.
In 1835 nearly all the lawyers of a county were disbarred for writing
withdrawn * * * from the
that "the public confidence seems to be
29
court. 28 Mr. Justice Field also wrote:
"Under our institutions arbitrary power over another's lawful
pursuits * * * is odious wherever exhibited, and nowhere does it
appear more so than when exercised by a judicial officer toward a
member of the bar practicing before him."
It may be that gangsters have ethics requiring machine gun assassination of any member who disrespectfully reveals the conduct of the
Little Caesar whose "judicial discretion" permitted the membership, but
they do not publish that code nor offer it as proof that theirs is an
"honorable profession."
"'Note, 21 L. R. A. 509.
"Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 302, 2 S. Ct. 569, 27 L. ed. 552 (1882).
'State v. McClaugherty, supra note 4.
'Bridges v. California, supra note 13.
-'Nixonv. State, 207 Ind. 426, 193 N.E. 591, 97 A. L. R. 894 (1935).
'Austin's Case, 5 Rawle (Pa.) 192 (1835).
-'Supranote 24.
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Alien Property Custodian Tightens Control
Over Transfer of Property to Persons
in Enemy Territory
Leo T. Crowley, Alien Property Custodian, has issued a regulation
known as General Order No. 20, which prohibits any payment, transfer
or distribution of property in the process of administration by a person
under judicial supervision or involved in any court or administrative
action or proceeding, to or for the benefit of any person in any place
under the control of an enemy country.
Executive Order No. 9095, as amended by Executive Order No.
9193, July 6, 1942, authorizes the Alien Property Custodian, under
Section 2 (f) thereof, to take such action as he deems necessary in the
national interest, including, but not limited to, the power to direct, manage, supervise, control or vest with respect to any property of any nature
whatsoever which is in the process of administration by any person acting under judicial supervision or which is in partition, libel, condemnation. or other similar proceedings and which is payable or deliverable to,
or claimed by, a designated enemy country or national thereof; and in
Section 5, to issue appropriate regulations governing the service of
process or notice upon any person within any designated enemy country
or any enemy-occupied territory in connection with any court or administrative action or proceeding within the United States. The Alien
Property Custodian also is authorized to take such other and further
measures in connection with representing any such person in any such
action or proceeding as in his judgment and discretion is or may be in
the interest of the United States.
General Order No. 5, issued on August 3, 1942, requires persons
or officers acting under judicial supervision, or in any court or administrative action or proceeding, or in partition, libel, or condemnation, or
other similar proceedings, to file with the Alien Property Custodian,
Form APC-3 covering the interests of persons in any enemy country or
enemy-occupied territory in such proceedings
General Order No. 6, dated August 3, 1942, provides that where,
in any court or administrative action or proceeding within the United
States, service of process or notice is required to be made upon a person
in any enemy country or enemy-occupied territory, a copy of such process or notice shall be sent by'registered mail to the Alien Property Custo-
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dian at Washington, D. C. The Alien Property Custodian may within
sixty days file a written acceptance of said service or refuse to accept the
same, as in his judgment or discretion may be in the interest of the
United States.
The purpose of General Order No. 20 is to postpone payment,
transfer, or distribution of property in certain court or administrative
actions or proceedings in the United States, as above described, until the
Alien Property Custodian has made a determination with respect to the
action to be taken therein.
To accomplish this purpose General Order No. 20 provides, in
effect, that no payment, transfer or distribution of property which is in
the process of administration or which is involved in any action or proceeding may be made to or for the benefit of any person within an enemy
or enemy-occupied country, unless the Custodian either (1) has consented thereto, or (2) has filed a statement that he does not desire to
represent such person, or (3) has appeared in the proceedings on behalf
of such person and has been given ninety days prior notice of the proposed payment, transfer or distribution. The Custodian will act in each
case as the facts and circumstances of that particular case demand.
Generally, in those cases in which the Custodian determines not to
represent such persons, the Custodian will disclaim his interest in any
proposed payment, transfer or distribution by filing with the court or
agency in which the proceeding is pending a written statement that he
has determined not -to represent the person to whom distribution is proposed to be made. However, if the procedure and circumstances demand,
the Custodian, in lieu of filing such statement, will issue a wrictei- c-,'sent to the proposed distribution.
The Custodian will also avail himself of the procedure of filing a
written consent in those cases where he has appeared in the proceedings
and desires to permit distribution prior to the expiration of tb- ninetyday period provided for.
Upon the issuance of a proper disclaimer in the manner specified in
this General Order No. 20, or in those cases where the Custodian has
appeared and the written notice of the proposed payment, transfer or
distribution has been given to him, and ninety days have expired without
the exercise of any power or authority by the Custodian with respect to
such property, the proposed payment, transfer or distribution may be
effected: provided, however, that such payment is licensed or otherwise
authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to the provisions of
Executive Order No. 8389, as amended.
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Army Adopts Colorado Bar Plan for
Legal Aid to Military Personnel
Chief of Staff G. C. Marshall announced that the War Department
and the American Bar Association have agreed to sponsor jointly a plan
to make adequate legal advice and assistance available throughout the
military establishment to military personnel in the conduct of their personal affairs.
Genesis of the plan originated at the Lowry Field Post when the
Colorado Bar Association's War Committee, under the able chairmanship of John L. Zanoni, originated free legal service to men in the armed
forces. The Lowry Field plan was approved first by the Area Corps
Commander and has since been adopted, with some modifications, by the
War Departmerit. When George M. Morris, President of the American
Bar Association, was in Colorado, he explored the Colorado bar plan
and stated that it was the most feasible and workable in the country. As
a result of his efforts, coupled with those of the state association, the plan
is now in effect in the entire country.
The service is to be gratuitous and will be rendered by volunteer
civilian lawyers and by lawyers who are in military service. General
Marshall's circular states that such gratuitous legal advice "should not
be considered as charity but entirely as a service of the same nature as
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medical, welfare, or other similar services provided for military personnel." He also adds that in any proper case the legal assistance office may
refer the serviceman to civilian counsel for retention upon the usual
civilian basis.
The general organization and direction of the plan have been
assigned to the Judge Advocate General, who will collaborate with the
Committee on War Work of the American Bar Association. Similarly,
the staff judge advocates of the various service commands will collaborate
with the committees on war work of the several state bar associations
within their respective service commands. Legal assistance offices are to
be opened at each post, camp and station within the United States, and
offices will also be established overseas with such modifications as may be
necessary to meet local conditions.
Each legal assistance office will, as far as practicable, be composed
of such military personnel as may be assigned to it;and such volunteer
civilian lawyers as may be designated by the appropriate state bar association's committee on war work. The legal assistance officer must be a
licensed attorney at law (apparently not required to be licensed in the
particular state where the camp is located). However, in the few cases
where lawyers in the armed forces are not available, suitable officers may
act temporarily, but may not give legal advice and counsel.
The usual attorney and client relationship is to be maintained and
all matters are to be considered as confidential and privileged. "Strict
observance of this rule is essential to the proper working of the office in
order to establish confidence in its integrity and to assure all military
personnel regardless of grade or position that they may disclose frankly
and completely all material facts of the case to the office personnel without fear that such confidences will be disclosed or used against them in
any way." The military personnel at the office will not appear before
civil courts, boards, or commissions as attorneys for persons using the
facilities of the office.
The new service is to be made available only to military personnel
and their dependents, "and this will include all members of, and persons
serving with the armed forces of the United States, including Army
nurses, members of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, and civilian
employees actually employed and residing on the military reservation
served by the office or employed at an overseas installation."
The Colorado Bar Lawyers War Emergency Committee, under the
chairmanship of Ben E. Sweet of Denver, has appointed a statewide committee with lawyers in every county to act in furtherance of this plan.
Each state in this army corps area is likewise appointing such statewide
committees.
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Excerpts from Claim Files
Contributed by RONALD V. YEGGF*

He hit me head-on going 60 miles per hour damaging my fender
for about $3.00.
I was seriously hurt and I don't think I will be able to work again,
but if you will send me check for $10 to cover my damage I will settle.

Enclosed is bill for $8.00 to my car. I want to be fair and that is
all I want, but if you don't pay I will sue for mitigated damage.
I heard that he drinks all the time and has killed three people last
week.

I did not contribute any negligence to the accident and as I did not
know the accident was going to happen 'cause I was asleep. Please send
me my damages.

I wish now that I had hired a lawyer before you decided I was
negligent.

A head-on collision occurred in a narrow canyon in the mountains.
The assured reported the accident, giving very meager details. The
claimant sent in a bill for repairs. To complete the file a letter was
addressed to the claimant requesting that he give the width of the road
and other facts. The following correspondence was exchanged:
Claimant:
"I don't know how wide the road is, and be damned if I am
going up there again to measure it, because that guy has run into
me four times already, and I'm not going to let him run into me
again."
Copy of this letter was sent to the assured, with an inquiry as to
the accuracy of the information contained in the letter. The assured
wrote as follows:
"He is a damn liar. I have only run into him three times."
*Of the Denver bar.
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My wife became pregnant as a result of the accident and is going
to have a miscarriage. Unless my claim is settled at once I will be forced
to blame it onto you.

I will not fool around in a small court, but will take you to the
Supreme Court immediately.
It is true that the accident was both our faults, but I don't see what
that has to do with my case.

_

Answer to subrogation demand: "If you think you can get any
money out of me just come up here and try it."

He shot out of the alley without warning and rammed his front end
into my body in the middle.

I am sorry that my son didn't lose his whole leg so that you would
(et stuck more damages.
Our judge here says that he will see to it that I get plenty of damages if I have to file suit.

My husband has lost his man power as a result of the accident and
I have had to get a man to take care of things that have to be done.
He admitted to me right before it happened that it was all his fault.
I am pleased to write you that my best cow was killed by your car.
We have a way to deal with people who steal or kill cattle and then
try and get out of it.
She and I came together on a lonely side road and there was no one
to pull us apart, so I was forced to go off and leave her there.
I and him decided both our insurance policies would fix the cars
and we ain't goin' back on our agreement.
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Comprehensive loss report: "My lady friend put her foot through
the glass in rear door, breaking it."
Extract from letter from Abraham
: "She hurt my
brother badly. She is charged by the policemen with reckless driving
and taking the right-of-way from a presbiterean."
I saw my lawyer and he said that I was at fault but if I wrote you
and insisted on my damage that you would pay his fee of $5.00. Please
send it immediately.

Nobody pays attention to the law here anyway, so I ain't going to
let you tell me what the law is.
He killed my wife but I don't care as long as they don't cause me
no trouble.
I slipped on the ice and sat down in a rush.
He has a reputation for backing out of his garage at unexceedable
speeds.
Thank you for the check.

It has relieved our pain and damages

a lot.
Before making an estimate the garage man wants to know if you
are going to check the damage.
Wire to insurance company representative 150 miles away: HAD
ACCIDENT SEND ADJUSTER AT ONCE.
Result: Damage, bent fender, $3.50
Expense of sending adjuster, $40.00
You ain't foolin' with no hicks.

If you don't pay, my attorney,

who is as mean as a hungry wolf, will be unleashed.
I have taken secret depositions that will be sprung on you in court.
He outsmarted me and gave me a drink so that I couldn't smell
liquor on his breath.
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Federal Judge Advocates Intelligence
Test for Jurors
Intelligence tests or some other method to weed out prospective
jurors who are unable to understand the complexities of civil trials are
suggested by Federal District Judge Clarence G. Galston of Brooklyn,
N. Y., in an article in the April issue of the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL.

Judge Galston refers to the fact that jurors serve as a "balance
wheel in the administration of justice." The judge continues:
"There is no rational or experiential ground which justifies
the belief that a jury is natively endowed with qualifications requisite to efficient performance of its duties. We make no such assumption in respect to lawyers, judges, doctors, ministers, engineers, or
of any others who follow professional or specialized vocations.
Whenever there is competent performance in any field of human
endeavor, we usually find training and education. Thus jurors are
no more heaven sent than are the other groups participating in the
trial of a law suit."
Judge Galston comments on the fact that many of those who are
summoned as jurors appear in a courthouse for the first time, where they
find strange surroundings and hear a new language. Many are not
familiar with the meanings of those terms which are taken for granted
by the legal profession. He states that if the jury system is to be preserved in civil causes, as it must be in the federal system, saving a constitutional amendment, consideration should be given to the desirability of
imposing an intelligence test upon those who are summoned as jurors.
Judge Galston refers to the practice in Los Angeles where those
summoned for jury duty are given a written test, supplemented by a
personal interview, which has resulted in the approval for jury service
of a comparatively small percentage of citizens whose names were taken
from the general register:
The article also discusses the number of jurors impaneled to try a
case and suggests that aside from tradition there is no reason to have
twelve.
In conclusion Judge Galston says:
"Let me preface a final suggestion by stating that I know of
no provision of law which compels secrecy concerning the deliberations of a civil petit jury. I am persuaded that if jury-room deliberations could be recorded, transcribed and filed with the verdict,
public opinion would realize the hit or miss nature of jury verdicts.
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There is no good reason why verdicts should be shrouded in secrecy
any more than are the findings by the court sitting without a jury.
Such recorded deliberations need not identify by name the juror
making any specific remark.
"In all fairness it must be conceded that the uncertainties of
trial by jury in part at least are inherent in law itself; for law, like
all other so-called social sciences, is not a science. But to admit the
uncertainties affords the strongest reason for seeking to control
them."

Secretary's Office Wants Bar Publications
The Secretary's office of the Colorado Bar Association is extremely
anxious to have a complete file of all publications issued by bar associations in the State of Colorado. We have missing from our files certain
issues of DICTA and we would appreciate it if anyone who has copies of
the following issues of DICTA would get in touch with the office of the
Secretary at 812 Equitable Building, Denver, Colorado, MAin 6273.
Missing numbers of DICTA:
1921 through 19 2 8--all numbers.
1929-March, April, June, August, September, November and
December.
1930-March, April, May, June, August, September and October.
1934--May, July, September.
1935--September, October and December.
1936-January, April, May, July, August, September, October,
November and December.
1937-August, September, October, November.
1938-January, February, March, July, August, September, October, November and December.
1940--March.
1941-May.
In addition to the missing numbers of DICTA, the Secretary's office
would like to have copies issued by the Colorado Bar Association of the
report of the Juvenile courts and copies of any publications issued by any
local bar associations.
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Troubleshooter
The Story of a Northwoods Prosecutor, by Robert Travers, Viking
Press, $2.75.
Troubleshooter is a book that "Big City" lawyers will read with
wishful longings; that is, all "Big City" lawyers except those residing
in Chicago-that city with an "utter lack of perso.nality"--because they
probably will be somewhat annoyed in their complacency by Mr. Travers' "profound pity for people who had to live in any large city"especially Chicago.
Troubleshooter is a book that the "country" lawyer will read with
earthy enjoyment. He will see in it some of the people with whom he
comes in contact every day. He'll recognize pro-types of some of his
clients, and see resemblances to some of the persons that he talked with
when he was in the district attorney's office (for what country lawyer
hasn't been a district attorney or an assistant district attorney some time
in his career?). The country lawyer will understand Travers' longing
to return to "the hills and woods, the lakes and streams and swamps;
the rocks and moss and matted leaves, the doze and murmur and measured pulse of my small town."
So Travers' story is one that will appeal to all lawyers-incidentally to all who like a tale well told-for it is a story of a small town
lawyer, who likes nothing better than to be a small town lawyer. It
concerns itself mainly with his experiences in the district attorney's office,
first as an assistant and then as the head man. In this book is paraded
the varied stories of the culprits who came before the bar of justice.
These stories are, for the greater part, well and vigorously told, and
there are incidents which reveal some of the mistakes of any trial lawyer
and point out pitfalls which could have bee.n avoided.
If it were not for the fact that the word "human" has been grossly
overused, we could use that adjective to describe this book; for it is a
collection of human experiences, especially those of the "humorous,
mirthful and passionate Finns" who reside in the upper peninsula of
Michigan. In any event, for a pleasant evening of vicarious enjoyment
among the people of the upper peninsula, we recommend Troubleshooter.
WM. H. ROBINSON. JR.
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Pre-Trial System of Nineteenth Century
Described in Letter
Essex County, Massachusetts, lawyers in the early part of the nineteenth century were using a pre-trial system of their own, as is shown in
correspondence of the noted Massachusetts jurist, Samuel Putnam.
In a letter of Judge Putnam's, reprinted from an historical society
pamphlet in the MASSACHUSETTS LAW QUARTFRLY, the pre-trial procedure of those days was described as follows:
"The habit of that Bar was to disclose freely to the adverse
counsel the points which were to be controverted or admitted,
whereby much expense to clients was saved. What out of court
was agreed to be admitted was always admitted on trial, and so
much expense and trouble of witnesses was prevented. No traps
were set. But the debatable ground was maintained with as much
earnestness as was consistent with good breeding. * * * Those
agreements were uniformly verbal, but always performed."

Denver Bar to Elect New Officers
Officers of the Denver Bar Association for the coming year will be
elected at the next meeting of the association on May 3rd. Designations
of the nominating committee are the following:
For PresidentFor First Vice-President
For Second Vice-President .........
For Trustees -Golding

Thomas Keely
Jean Breitenstein
John Gorsuch
Fairfield
1Edwin J. Wittelshofer

LOST, STRAYED OR STOLEN
Volume 16 of the Colorado Appeals Reports is unaccountably missing from the library of Division I of the District Court,
and no one seems to know just how long it has been gone. So
please look for it in your library. Judge Steele would like to have
it back and promises that no questions will be asked.
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James H. Hunter
James H. Hunter of 175 South Emerson Street, Denver, Colorado,
librarian and crier .for the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in
Derver, died in St. Luke's Hospital in Denver, on April 21, 1943, after
a brief illness. He was 84 years of age.
Mr. Hunter was born in Scotland in 1858, and came to the United
States when he was 10. He moved to Murphysboro, Illinois, and there
married Miss Sarah Wild in September, 1879. He came to Denver in
1886, and worked for the Colorado Midland Railway, later becoming
yardmaster in Aspen. He was employed by the Denver Tramway Company as a motorman in 1889, and resigned in 1914 to become superintendent of the zoo, which position he held until 1923. He then became
a deputy United States marshal and was later a bailiff of the United
States District Court in Denver. In 1931 he was appointed crier for the
Circuit Court of Appeals and assumed the duties of librarian for that
court in 1937.
Surviving are his wife, Sarah, a son, James W. Hunter, two daughters, Mrs. Harry F. Chrysler and Mrs. David B. Sauve, a sister, Mrs. L.
R. Greiner, and several grandchildren.
Mr. Hunter was well known in Denver, and has been a familiar
figure in the federal court rooms for many years. His passing leaves a
vacant space in the hearts of many of us.
"All politics is the rivalry of organized minorities; the voters are
bleacher athletes who cheer the victors and jeer the defeated, but do not
otherwise contribute to the result. -- WILL DURANT.

One Hundred Years Ago
The following items appeared in the, New York Tribune of April

5, 1843:
HON. DANIEL WEBSTER arrived in this city yesterday, and took lodgings at the Astor House.
THE LEGISLATURE OF MAINE at its recent session passed a law declaring
that every person of good moral character might practice law in the
state.
THE PEITHOLOGIAN SOCIETY OF COLUMBIA COLLEGE held their thir-

ty-seventh anniversary this evening at Niblo's saloon.
-Submitted

by FRANK L. FETZER.
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Lawyer Population and Judicial Salaries
According to G. Dexter Blount, a committee of American Bar
Association has recently issued statistics with reference to the lawyer
population of the United States and the several states, and salaries paid
to Supreme Court Justices. They contain the following informaijon
based upon the United States Census of 1940:
In the United States there were 179,544 lawyers, or one lawyer for
each group of 733 residents. In Colorado there were 1,454 lawyers, or
one lawyer for each group of 772 persons. Colorado ranked 17th among
the states in the ratio of population to each lawyer. Alabama ranked
last, with one lawyer to 1,731 persons.
in the fifteen largest cities in the United States the average was one
lawyer to each group of 398 residents. These cities ranged from one
lawyer to 137 residents in Washington, D. C., to one lawyer to 885 in
Cleveland, Ohio.
Other interesting facts disclosed are that Colorado, which paid each
Justice of the Supreme Court a salary of $6,500, ranked 40th among
the states in the size of the salaries paid to Justices. The 48th is South
Dakota, which paid $4,800. The top ranking state is New York, which
paid $22,500. All states bordering on Colorado except Kansas and
Utah paid higher salaries to their Justices than did Colorado.
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